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COMMANDERY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLIBIA 



WAR PAPER 72. 



,r|e Rattle of fvasqOille. 






Milifarv; ©rder of fl^e Iso^al l£)G|ion 



OF THE 



United §fafes. 



dOHHANDEl^Y OF THE DI^TI^ICT OF COLUI^BIJ^. 

WAR PAPERS. 

72 

Bailie of IKasKville. 

prepared by companion 

Captain 

LEVERETT M. KELLEY, 

U. S. Volunteers, 

AND 

READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF JANUARY 1, 1908. 






Digitized by the Internet Arciiive 
in 2010:witli funding from 
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littp://www.archive.org/details/battleofnaslivillOOkell 



Sattb of Naaljutlk. 



The object of the invasion of Tennessee by General Hood 
was outHned in the general orders of Beauregard, to "deal 
rapid and vigorous blows — to strike the enemy while dispersed, 
and by that distract Sherman's advance into Georgia." Hood 
had pledged his troops that they should eat their Christmas 
dinner in Nashville ; and to redeem that pledge and accomplish 
the declared object of the campaign required rapid movements. 
Well he knew that to allow his opponent time to concentrate 
his scattered forces, would render the fulfillment of his pledges 
difficult, and jeopardize the entire campaign. Hence the rapid- 
ity of his movements. 

It was General Thomas' design on assuming command, to 
make the Tennessee River his base of operations, but the 
tardy movement of the widely-scattered detachments com- 
prising his command, prevented his assuming the oflfensive 
and offering battle in the heart of the so-called Confederacy. 
The three veteran divisions of A. J. Smith and Winslow's 
cavalry, while on the way to join him, were temporarily di- 
verted to Missouri to assist in the expulsion of Price. Steed- 
man was holding the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, 
which it was not prudent to abandon until the enemy's plans 
were developed and his objective point known. The Fourth 
and Twenty-third Corps, under Schofield, were to the front, 
in the vain endeavor to check, or at least delay the advance 
of Hood. 

It was not until the first of December that these detachments 
were concentrated at Nashville, and that General Thomas 



found himself at the head of an army sufficiently numerous 
to assure him of victory. 

His cavalry had been without horses, and in the absence of 
a mounted force equal in numbers and efficiency to that of 
General Forest, with which to follow up an advantage. A 
victory, under such circumstances, would have been barren of 
permanent results. Hence the necessity for the retreat upon 
Nashville and the unavoidable delay of two weeks before the 
attack was made, during which time Hood, confronting him 
only from the south, was deluded into the belief that the city 
of Nashville was enduring all the rigors of a siege. 

General Schofield's colmun, after the battle of Franklin, 
proceeded to Nashville unmolested, the rear guard reaching the 
city at one o'clock on the afternoon of the ist of December. 
On their arrival, the different corps were assigned to positions 
on the defensive line, selected by General Thomas. The 
Fourth Corps, under General Wood (who upon the wounding 
and retirement of General Stanley had succeeded to the com- 
mand), took up its position on the Hillsboro and Granny White 
pikes — the key-point and center of the defensive line. Gen- 
eral A. J. Smith was posted on the right and General Schofield, 
now commanding only the Twenty-third Corps, occupied the 
left. General Steedman, with a considerable force, distrib- 
uted along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, 
to keep open the communications and guard against flank move- 
ments, was ordered to the general rendezvous, as soon as it 
was rendered certain that Nashville was the object of Hood's 
attack. His arrival with five thousand men, on the evening 
of the 1st, completed the concentration of the forces for the 
defence of the city and for offensive movements. 

Numerically, General Thomas' army was now superior to 
Hood's — numbering quite fifty-five thousand, of all arms; 



composed of detachments from almost every district, depart- 
ment and military sub-division known in the west with an 
infusion of raw, hundred-day infantry regiments and colored 
troops. Deducting the losses sustained in the engagement at 
Franklin. Hood's army at this time numbered not far from 
forty thousand. 

The terrible castigation inflicted upon the enemy on the 30th, 
induced General Hood to proceed with more caution than 
usual, and it was not until the 3rd of December that his 
infantry appeared in force and commenced the construction 
of a line of works along the heights, two and a half miles 
south of the city. The outer pickets were driven in, after 
skirmishing with the rebel advance, and the next morning the 
southern cross was discovered waving from the summit of 
Montgomery Hill, within six hundred yards of the Federal 
position. At once, from Forts Negley, Morton, Confiscation 
and from salient points in General Wood's front, nearest the 
enemy's position, an artillery fire was opened upon their works. 
But, intent on making his line secure, and doubtless husbanding 
his ammunition, the enemy continueed to throw up entrench- 
ments, and responded but feebly to the Federal cannonade. 

After the completion of his works General Hood remained 
inactive in his position, his army one of observation, rather 
than invasion. But his cavalry was vigilant and untiring in its 
demonstrations upon the posts still held by us, above and 
below the city, and upon the block-houses along the line of the 
Chattanooga Railroad. 

The country, unaware of the insuperable obstacles to an 
immediate attack, grew restive at the apparent delay of Gen- 
eral Thomas, and clamored for his removal. General Grant 
expressed much uneasiness in regard to the situation, fearing 
that Hood would by a flank movement cross the Cumberland, 



march into Kentucky and re-enact the Bragg and Buell cam- 
paign of 1862. Conscious of doing all that was in the power 
of any man in a like situation to do, and of the rectitude and 
wisdom of his purposes, he was not to be driven into a move- 
ment against his better judgment, or forced to commence 
offensive operations until such time as his preparations were in 
a state to assure him of success. He preferred to be relieved 
rather than be responsible for the results of a battle fought 
under unfavorable conditions. 

By the 9th of December, General Wilson had mounted and 
armed a force of cavalry sufificient for present needs, and all 
things essential to a vigorous campaign were in readiness and 
an attack was determineed upon. But with the completion 
of his preparations, came a terrible storm of rain and sleet, 
which, freezing as it fell, covered the whole country with a 
sheet of ice, upon which horses and men could with difficulty 
stand, much less advance up steep slopes and fight to any 
advantage. In endeavoring to get the cavalry in position, 
many horses fell upon the hard and slippery ice, some being 
killed and others permanently disabled. The same cause that 
delayed the attack, held Hood in a vise — ice-bound on the 
storm-beaten hills, and he could not, if he would, escape the 
fate that awaited him. 

Death and casualties resulting from the battle of Franklin 
wrought many changes in the field and line officers of the 
Fourth Corps. General Thomas J. Wood, brave, intrepid 
and prompt, commanded the corps after the wounding of 
General Stanley. General Wagner, also wounded in that 
engagement, for some time persisted in remaining at the head 
of his division, but was at last obliged to succumb, and pro- 
ceeded to Louisville for medical treatment. 

On the 14th the weather began to moderate, and by noon 



the ice had so far melted as to be no longer a hinderance to 
army movements, and General Thomas resolved upon attack- 
ing the next day, for which immediate preparations were made. 
General Wilson with the greater portion of the cavalry was 
sent to the right of General A. J. Smith, to guard that flank 
and to assist in turning the enemy's position, and to follow up 
any advantage that might be gained. The corps commanders 
were called together for consultation, and to receive final 
instructions regarding the specific movements of their re- 
spective commands. The general outline of the plan of action 
resolved upon, was to throw a sufficient force upon the enemy's 
left and front to carry the position. At the same time Gen- 
eral Steedman was to demonstrate upon their right, to attract 
attention, hold their forces and prevent, as far as possible, 
reinforcements being sent to the left, where the principal attack 
was to be made. 

At daylight on the 15th the several commands began to 
move to the positions assigned them by the orders of the day 
before. A dense fog curtained the landscape, hiding the two 
armies from each other, which, with the undulations of the 
ground, concealed the movements of the national troops as 
they maneuvred for position. The troops in the entrenchments 
after being relieved by hundred-day men, quartermaster's em- 
ployes and irregular detachments organized for that purpose 
took up positions in advance. General A. J. Smith advanced 
his divisions to the Harding and Charlotte pikes, skirmishing 
heavily with the enemy's outposts silencing a battery and 
menacing his left. The Twenty-third Corps, when relieved by 
General Cruft, moved rapidly from the left to the right, taking 
position in the interval between the Fourth Corps and General 
Smith's command, partially in rear and in support of each. 
After the deployment of the infantry, the cavalry under Gen- 



8 



eral Wilson at once assumed position on the extreme right 
reaching out and lapping around the rebel left. The Fourth 
Corps, under General Wood, was formed in the following 
order : The First Division in the center, the Third Division 
on the left, and the Second Division on the right, in double 
battle line, the first deployed, while the second in reserve was 
formed in column by divisions opposite the intervals jn the 
first. In front was a cloud of skirmishers, that under cover 
of the fog advanced near to and in point blank range of the 
enemy's first line, keeping up a close fire and picking ofif those 
that showed themselves above the works. 

Great was the astonishment of the Confederates upon the 
clearing up of the fog, at seeing long blue lines of Federal 
troops drawn up in battle array and menacing them in front 
and flank. At frequent intervals along the line batteries were 
in position, occasionally trying the effect of shot at long range, 
or covering the advance of skirmishers. Ammunition and 
ambulance trains were snugly sheltered in ravines. The work 
of storming the hills was mainly left to the infantry, who 
near at hand was massed behind hills or in open fields, impa- 
tiently waiting the opening of a conflict that in its efifects was 
to be decisive of rebellion in the west. The enemy's bat- 
teries, which during the twelve days of nominal investment 
had been quietly perched upon the hill tops, pointing toward 
the city and grimly overlooking the intervening slopes, until 
now voiceless and still, suddenly aroused from their lethargy, 
and the roar of cannon, like the sullen bark of watch-dogs 
awoke answering echoes from hill and valley; The skirmish- 
ers, concealed from sight within the enveloping folds of misty 
fog curtains, advanced well to the front, and established them- 
selves in close proximity to the Confederate lines. When 
preparations for the attack were completed, and troops in 



position to assail the front and flank of the enemy's line, 
General Steedman was ordered to advance, against Hood's 
right, in semblance of an assault, with as much display of 
force and vigor of movement as possible, in order to deceive 
the Confederate commander as to the real point of attaclc. 
General Steedman had already organized a strong column for 
the purpose, composed of detachments from three brigades, 
including a large number of colored troops, who for the first 
time in the west were to compete with white soldiers and 
veterans of years of experience and discipline, upon the battle 
field. Prompt to the order, the column marched out and 
swept gallantly up the slope of a hill in front, on the summit of 
which the enemy's pickets were strongly posted. These were 
hurled from their position, and rushing pell-mell down the 
opposite declivity, were chased to cover behind a line of works, 
erected on the south of the Chattanooga Railroad. With one 
bold dash this was carried, and almost before the enemy was 
aware of the movement, the works were in our hands. This 
advance was made in the face of a heavy fire, with scarcely a 
halt. So little reliance had been placed in the colored soldiers' 
ability to stand fire, that a line was formed in reserve with 
bayonets fixed for the purpose of holding them to their work. 
But the result proved there was no necessity for this, as the 
negroes were not outdone in gallantry and steadiness, and no 
body of regulars could have been under better discipline, or 
easier handled. 

After capturing the works. General Steedman thought to 
change his feint to a real attack, and proposed to hold what 
he had gained. It was only on this flank that the advance of 
the enemy had been seriously opposed, and resistance offered 
to the construction of offensive works. The spirited advance 
and tenacity of purpose displayed by Steedman, completely 



10 



deceived the rebel commander to the ultimate purpose of his 
adversary, and he drew largely from his center and left, thereby 
greatly weakening the force that was to meet the real attack, 
and hurried reinforcements to his right — the point threatened 
by Steedman — but which in reality was only a diversion to 
attract attention from combinations forming at other portions 
of the line. Against the preponderating numbers now hurled 
against him, the exposure to enfilading batteries, stationed on 
the surrounding hills and concentrated upon this single point, 
rendering it untenable. General Steedman saw that the position 
could not be held, and withdrew to the shelter of the hill in 
front, holding, himself in readiness to execute other movements 
in carrying out the general plan of operations. The object of 
this first demonstration was fully accomplished, for the con- 
tinued roar of guns away to the right, indicated that Schofield, 
Smith and Wood were launching their thunderbolts and di- 
recting assaults against a weakened adversary, and executing 
to the letter their part of the grand plan so minutely set forth 
in General Thomas' orders. 

Directly in front of the Fourth Corps was Montgomery 
Hill, towering a hundred feet above the surrounding hills, a 
position strong by nature, fortified and strengthened by Hood 
and regarded as the principal salient in the enemy's line. The 
ascent, except on the left and rear, was rocky and precipitous, 
and covered with thick underbrush and forest trees. The 
approaches were intersected by abatis and sharpened stakes 
firmly planted in the ground. The summit bristled with can- 
non, situated so as to enfilade the approaches and cut down an 
approaching column. Up this ascent, fronted and flanked by 
batteries, and these supported by heavy lines of infantry must 
move the storming column. 

Having secured the hill and Hood's advance line, General 



11 



Wood brought forward his batteries, advanced his skirmish- 
ers, and made preparations for carrying the second Hne of 
works. 

Smith's charge on the right was throwing the enemy into 
confusion. A general advance of the Federal line in front 
increased their excitement, and Httle squads of panic-stricken 
rebels were filtering to the rear, and fleeing to the valley to 
the left of the projecting salient. 

In a line of battle miles in extent, composed of separate 
divisions and army corps, the movement and details cannot be 
taken in from a single standpoint, and the battle of Nashville 
was not an exception. 

The booming Steedman's guns on the extreme left was the 
signal for A. J. Smith to commence the initiative of battle on 
the right. The division moved rapidly behind its skirmishers, 
upon the Harding and Hillsboro pikes, gradually wheeling to 
the left, until his line was parallel to, and in advance of, the 
Harding road. 

The converging lines of advance brought the wings of A. J. 
Smith and the Fourth Corps together, and the interval being 
closed, General Schofield rapidly passed in rear of A. J. Smith 
with the Twenty-third Corps, and forming on his right, moved 
in conjunction with it against the enemy's left. A number of 
minor positions, situated on a group of hills near the Hillsboro 
pike, were carried after slight opposition, and the enemy 
driven, with loss of prisoners, across the road and the valley 
beyond, to a second range of hills overlooking the Granny 
White pike. The Confederate commander having partially 
recovered from his surprise, collected a heavy force with 
which to deal a counter blow, or at least check the sweeping 
charges which Smith, Schofield and Wilson was hurling on 
his left. 



12 



One of Schofield's brigades, under General Cooper, crossed 
the valley and commenced the ascent of the hills, when a heavy 
force coming up the left appeared in his rear, and there was a 
danger of the brigade being crushed between two opposing 
forces, but Generals Cox and Couch promptly advanced against 
the latter, giving them sufficient occupation in warding ofif their 
blows, as to divert attention from Cooper and his brigade, 
which was in no wise endangered, but gallantly executed the 
movement it had commenced, and carried the left of a series 
of hills overlooking and commanding the Granny White pike. 
In the valley the resistance was obstinate, and a furious en- 
gagement continued until dark, attended with considerable loss 
on both sides. The enemy was eventually forced to retire, 
and occupied the hills extending south from the position occu- 
pied by Cooper. Darkness put an end to further movements 
in this quarter, and after entrenching the positions gained, the 
troops bivouaced for the night. 

The Fourth Corps moved simultaneously with General Smith 
against the second line of works, in rear of Montgomery Hill. 
The reserves were brought ujo and formed in line of battle, 
with the intention of engaging the enemy with the entire 
corps. In front of General Kimball's Division was an eleva- 
tion strongly fortified. The fire of Wood's batteries was 
concentrated upon this hill for an hour, during which timfe 
Smith and Wilson were assailing the enemy's left, crushing 
their lines and capturing one after another of their salients 
and batteries. All being in readiness, the order to charge was 
given, and swiftly the column moved to its appointed attack. 
Scarcely had it started, when word was given to double-quick. 
Cheer upon cheer swelled up from the ranks ; the fatigues of 
last night's anxious watching; the strain upon the mind and 
muscle, incident to the excitement of the occasion were for- 



13 

gotten, and Kimball's whole division, with an impetuosity 
which nothing could check, ascended the hill, stormed the ram- 
parts, and captured colors, cannon and prisoners. There was 
no pause from the commencement of the charge until its 
brilliant an^ successful termination. 

No defeat was more crushing to the Confederate cause in 
the west, or victory to the Federal arms more complete, than 
this last struggle of the rebellion about Nashville. Its army 
had fought with distinction, and covered itself with glory on 
many a historic field. In all the battles of the west, from 
Perryville, Shiloh, Stone River, Chickamauga, Atlanta, Frank- 
lin to Nashville, where it found an honored grave, it had fought 
with distinction. Its patient endurance of hardships, its per- 
sistence, bravery, fortitude in defeat, and the tenacity with 
which it had clung to their cause, from friend and foe alike 
challenged admiration and respect. Lee's army in the east 
and Hood's in the west were the only remaining supports of 
the rebellion. One of these was now broken, its remnants 
fleeing southward as a disorganized rabble, and from the 
crushing effects of this defeat it never again recovered. The 
immediate fruits of this victory were four thousand four 
hundred and sixty-two prisoners, including one major general, 
three brigadiers, two hundred and eighty officers of lower 
grade, all the wounded upon the field, fifty-three pieces of 
artillery, thousands of small arms, and twenty-five battle flags. 
Mill Springs and Nashville, the only battles of the war in 
which Major General George H. Thomas held supreme com- 
mand, were alike in their results — the annihilation of the op- 
posing army. 



